I can see absolutely no flaw in the following argument by Daryl McCullough.
My complaint about rephrasing Godel’s result as saying that the Godel sentence G can neither be proved nor disproved is that, to me, the ontological status of “G cannot be proved” is *exactly* the same as the status of “G is true”. To say that G is true is to say that there does not exist a natural number satisfying such and such a property. To say that G cannot be proved is to say that there does not exist a proof satisfying such and such a property. I don’t see how the latter makes any less ontological commitment than the former.
GARGH! Thus (unless someone can furnish me with a reason why it may be wrong) I probably going to have to accept that there isn’t really a good reason not to say “true”. After all there is no alternative rendering that avoids the same potential confusions and we don’t expect popularisations to define things perfectly – just to give the “shape” of the idea, so any confusion between a technical use of “true” and an everyday one is acceptable (they are different but close enough to get some understanding – it’s not like “group”).
It still seems squicky to me but I guess that’s my problem.